Florida Law Review
Volume 25

Issue 3

Article 4

March 1973

Notice of Breach and the Uniform Commercial Code
Marvin Chavis

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Marvin Chavis, Notice of Breach and the Uniform Commercial Code, 25 Fla. L. Rev. 520 (1973).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol25/iss3/4

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by UF Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Florida Law Review by an authorized editor of UF Law Scholarship Repository. For more information,
please contact kaleita@law.ufl.edu.

Chavis: Notice
Breach and
theREVIEW
Uniform Commercial
[Vol.Code
XXV
UNIVERSITY
OFof
FLORIDA
LAW
(c) The administrator shall furnish each and every patient in a facility for the
mentally ill in this state, both public and private, with suitable material for writing, enclosing, sealing, stamping and mailing letters, sufficient at least for the writing of two
letters per week, provided they request the same; and all such letters shall be deposited
by the writers thereof, accompanied by an attendant when necessary, into a United States
mail box.
(d) Each and every patient hospitalized in a facility for the mentally ill in this state,
both public and private, shall be entitled to receive his or her attorney, physician, guardian,
or personal representative at all reasonable times. The patient is entitled to receive other
visitors subject to the general rules and regulations of the facility and except to the
extent that the administrator determines that it is necessary for the medical welfare of
the patient to impose restrictions.
(e) Any person refusing or neglecting to comply with, or wilfully or knowingly violating,
any of the provisions of this section shall be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not
more than one year, or both, and shall be ineligible for employment in any facility for the
mentally ill in this state after conviction.
(f) A printed copy of this section shall be framed and kept posted in every ward of
every facility for the mentally ill in this state, both public and private.

NOTICE OF BREACH AND THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
Section 2-607 of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) provides that
acceptance of goods does not preclude the buyer's recovery against the seller
for a breach of the sales contract., As a prerequisite to such recovery, however, the buyer must give the seller timely notification of the breach. 2 Since
3
all but one of the states have adopted the Uniform Commercial Code, it is
extremely important that merchants and consumers familiarize themselves
with the notice requirement of the Code. Perhaps no other single requisite
under the sales law is more critical 4 or more confusing than the notice requirement of section 2-607.3 This note will examine the purpose, scope, and requirements of the notice provision and suggest its proper role.
§2-607 (2).
§2-607 (3) (a).
3. As of 1972 only Louisiana had failed to adopt the UCC. In addition to the other
forty-nine states, the District of Columbia and the Virgin Islands have also adopted the
Code. See UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE XXXV (1972 Pamphlet).
4. The importance of the provision is shown by the numerous cases where the seller
has prevailed simply because the buyer failed to give proper notice within a reasonable
time. See, e.g., Beacon Plastic & Metal Prods., Inc. v. Corn Prods. Co., 57 Misc. 2d 634,
293 N.Y.S.2d 429 (1968); Wagner Tractor, Inc. v. Shields, 381 F.2d 441 (9th Cir. 1967).
5. Much of the confusion has arisen from the development of the theory of strict tort
liability and its application to transactions normally considered to be within sales law.
For a detailed discussion of this problem, see Phillips, Notice of Breach in Sales and Strict
Tort Liability Law: Should There be a Difference?, 47 IND. L.J. 457 (1971) [hereinafter
cited as Phillips].
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THE NoTIcE PRovisIoN
Under the common law, states generally did not require notice; the
buyer's acceptance of title to goods served as a waiver or release of the seller's
liability from certain of his contractual duties.6 Section 49 of the Uniform
Sales Act' served to ameliorate the harshness of the common law for the
buyer by providing that, absent an express contrary agreement, acceptance
of the goods by the buyer did not discharge the seller from liability for breach
of his promise or warranty.8 The drafters of the Uniform Sales Act also felt
it necessary to protect the seller from belated claims by the buyer:9
[l1f, after acceptance of the goods, the buyer fail [sic] to give notice to
the seller of the breach of any promise or warranty within a reasonable time after the buyer knows, or ought to know of such breach, the
seller shall not be liable therefor.
This provision of the Uniform Sales Act was the predecessor of section 2-607
of the Code.10
The Code, like the Sales Act, also provides that mere acceptance of the
goods does not itself impair any of the buyer's remedies so long as "within a
reasonable time after he discovers or should have discovered any breach
[he notifies] the seller of the breach.""' Failure to notify the seller within a
reasonable time will bar recovery under any remedy the buyer might have.
This provision, specifically designed to protect the seller, forestalls commercial bad faith on the part of the buyer. 12 However, in order to truly appreciate
the functions of this provision, it is first necessary to scrutinize the purpose
of the notice requirement.
The Purpose of the Notice Requirement
Some suggest that the notice requirement grew out of suspicion that
buyers were using stale and unfounded claims to avoid or reduce price recov-

6. See 3 S. WiLusroN, CONTRaCTS §714 (rev. ed. 1961).

7.

UNIFORM SM.Es ACT §49 (1950).
8. Section 49 provides: "In the absence of express or implied agreement of the parties,
acceptance of the goods by the buyer shall not discharge the seller from liability in damages
or other legal remedy for breach of any promise or warranty in the contract to sell or the
sale." See also Whitfield v. Jessup, 31 Cal. 2d 826, 193 P.2d 1, 2 (1958).
9. UNIFORM SALEs Acr §49 (1950).
10. The Official Comments to §2-607 indicate that the purpose of the changes under
the Code are: "To continue the prior basic policies with respect to acceptance of goods while
making a number of minor though material changes in the interest of simplicity and commercial convenience." UNIFORM COMMECIAL CODE §2-607 (Official Comments). Because
§2-607 is a continuation of §49 of the Sales Act, most states still rely upon case law under
the Sales Act as authority for holdings under the Code. See, e.g., San Antonio v. Warwick
Club Ginger Ale Co., 104 R.I. 700, 703, 249 A.2d 778, 781 (1968).
11. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §2-607(3)(a).
12. See note 44 infra.
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ery by the seller. 13 It is equally tenable, however, that the requirement arose
as an extension of the notice requisite of contract recision.'" Whatever the
reasons for its adoption, the notice provision was clearly intended to protect
sellers of goods from the prejudice that might result from delayed notice of
breach.' 5
Under the Sales Act and the Code, the seller's tender of the goods is
treated as an offer of them in full satisfaction of the seller's obligations
under the contract."; The buyer is allowed a reasonable time in which to
accept the offer. If the buyer declines to take the goods in full satisfaction he
need not return them, but must notify the seller that he is demanding damages for breach in addition to the goods.
The practical advantages of such a rule are clear. The buyer may accept
the goods without prejudicing his rights under the contract and the seller
need not worry about claims for damages arising from a sale he considers
closed. The prompt notice requirement gives the seller timely information
that the buyer proposes to hold him liable for breach, thus affording the
seller ample opportunity to cure the defect, inspect the goods, investigate
the claim, or do whatever may be necessary to properly defend himself or
17
minimize his damages while the facts are fresh in the minds of the parties.
Although the right of the seller under section 2-508 of the Code to cure
a defect generally applies to situations where the buyer may still rescind the
contract,' the right to cure has also been asserted as one purpose for requiring notice.' 9 Many times the delay and expense of litigation can be avoided
by simply allowing the seller to cure the defect before substantial damages
result. In some instances the contract itself may stipulate that the seller be

13. Phillips, supra note 5, at 465, citing J.
OF SALES AND SALES FINANCING 218

HONNOLD,

CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW

(3d ed. 1968).

3 S. WILLISTON, THE LAW GOVERNING SALES OF GOODS AT COMMrON LAW AND UNDER
UNIFORM SALES AcT §484(a) (rev. ed. 1948). [hereinafter cited as S. WILLISTON]. Cases

14.
THE

under both the Sales Act and the Code treat untimely notice of rescission as having the
same effect as untimely notice of breach. See Ingle v. Marked Tree Equip. Co., 244 Ark.

1166, 428 S.W. 2d 286 (1968); Hudspeth Motors, Inc. v. Wilkinson, 238 Ark. 410, 382 S.W.2d
191 (1964). Arguably, the Code policies favoring prompt cure and disposal of goods in
rescission do not extend to claims for damages after acceptance. However, while Comment 4
to Code §2-607 recognizes that the requirements as to content of notice are less rigorous
where mere damages are claimed, it does not indicate there is any difference in the require-

ment of the timeliness of the notice.
15. In some cases where no prejudice to the seller was shown, the court has waived
the notice requirement. See, e.g., Pritchard v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 295 F.2d -292
(3d Cir. 1961); Bengford v. Carlem Corp., 156 N.W.2d 855 (Iowa 1968).
16. See S. 'WILLISTON, CONTRACTS §714 (a) (rev. ed. 1938).
17. Truslow & Fulle, Inc. v. Diamond Bottling Corp., 112 Conn. 181, 187, 151 A. 492,
495 (1930).
18. Section 2-508 provides for the right to cure "[w]here any tender of delivery by the
seller is rejected because non-conforming and the time for performance has not yet
expired . . .[for]
[w]here the buyer rejects a non-conforming tender which the seller had
reasonable grounds to believe would be acceptable with or without money allowance."
UNIFORM

19.

COMMERCIAL

CODE

§2-508.

Whitfield v. Jessup, 31 Cal. 2d 826, 830, 193 P.2d 1, 3 (1948).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1973

3

1973]

Florida Law Review, Vol. 25, Iss. 3 [1973], Art. 4

NOTICE OF BREACH AND THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE

523

given an opportunity to remedy a defect as a condition precedent to his
liability. In Draffin v. Chrysler Motors Corp.,20 the Supreme Court of South
Carolina held that where the warranty under a contract of sale provided that
service would be performed by the authorized dealer at the dealer's place of
business without charge for replacement parts or labor, no liability arose
under the warranty until the warrantor had been given reasonable notice and
sufficient opportunity to remedy the alleged defects.21 Insuring ample opportunity to cure the defect is most crucial when the buyer must continue using
the defective goods. In such a situation the buyer may be under a duty to
mitigate damages2 2 by allowing the seller to remedy the defect before further
damage results.
In addition to his right to cure, the seller's right to inspect the goods is
also protected by the notice requirement. Section 2-515 of the Code provides
that in any claim or dispute, either party, upon reasonable notification, has
the right to inspect, test, and sample the goods to ascertain the facts and to
preserve the evidence.2 3 The significance of this right was illustrated in
Owen v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.,24 where the buyer claimed damages for personal injuries resulting from being burned by a shirt purchased from the
defendant. Because the plaintiff waited two years to notify the defendant
of the claim, the appellate court affirmed a directed verdict in favor of the
defendant based on the unreasonable delay in giving notice.25 The defendant
successfully argued that had he been promptly notified of the claim he could
have tested shirts from the same lot for inflammable characteristics.8 After
two years, however, it was impossible for the defendant to ascertain the facts
necessary to properly defend the action.
Inspection is not as important when the causal relationship, and not the
actual occurrence, is in issue. 27 In these cases scientific or expert testimony
is usually required, making a timely inspection of the goods inconsequential.2s
A prompt inspection would, however, allow the retailer or manufacturer to

20. 252 S. C. 348, 166 S.E2d 305 (1969).
21. Id. at 308.
22. See Wagner Tractor, Inc. v. Shields, 381 F.2d 441 (9th Cir. 1967), where it was held
that a tractor manufacturer had not been given adequate notice of a breach of implied
warranty of fitness of two tractors and therefore was not liable for the breach. The court
stated the purpose of the notice was "to enable the seller to minimize any damages or
correct the defect." Id. at 445.
23. UNIFoRm COMMRCIAL CODE §2-515.
24. 273 F.2d 140 (9th Cir. 1959).
25. Id. at 143.
26. Id.
27. See, e.g., Pritchard v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 295 F.2d 292 (3rd Cir. 1961).
There the plaintiff sought recovery for injuries resulting from lung cancer allegedly con.
tracted from cigarettes manufactured by the defendant. The court held that plaintiff's
claim was not barred, since defendant had not been prejudiced by the ten and one-half
month delay in giving notice. Timely inspection would have served no purpose in ascertaining whether the cigarettes actually caused the lung cancer.
28. The layman may be inexperienced in the scientific complications of a case, which
may take many weeks of preparation and trial to unravel. Id. at 299.
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ascertain the nature of the defect. He could then change or halt production to
eliminate the cause, remove remaining goods from the chain of distribution,
and alert other consumers of the defect2 9 Without prompt notice the benefit
of avoiding further injury to the public would be lost.
Furthermore, seasonable notice enables the seller or manufacturer to
review his records, contact witnesses, test the products involved, and generally
investigate the claim. In Columbia Axle Co. v. American Automobile Insurance Co.,30 the court held the plaintiff's six-month delay in notifying the
defendant was unreasonable as a matter of law. Although the plaintiff
offered to furnish a list of witnesses and to share the results of metallurgical
tests made in its laboratory, such evidence could not undo the prejudice the
defendant had suffered as a result of the delay.31 This holding indicates that
the purpose of notice is to give the seller ample opportunity to carry out his
own investigation of the defect; forcing him to rely upon the findings of the
buyer is no substitute.
Seasonable notice may also lead to a settlement of the claim without
litigation. 32 The Code and cases alike recognize the importance of this purpose,33 since an early complaint may result in a settlement of the dispute
before it hardens with the passage of time.34 In addition, early notice enables
the seller to minimize his damages by negotiating settlements with third
parties and by suggesting ways to avoid further damage.35
Much of the Code reflects the law's traditional goal of compromise.36
However, many times a lay consumer may be pressured unknowingly into a
fraudulent settlement. Although such a settlement may be set aside,37 there
is no assurance that this will be possible in all cases. This possibility of
injustice to the lay consumer, however, must be balanced against the desirability of compromise. One suggested approach to this problem would make

29. The effectiveness of this particular protection may be questionable because of the
difficulty and cost of locating goods in the mass marketing system of today. See Note,
Notice Requirement in Warranty Actions Involving Personal Injury, 51 CALIF. L. RE.V. 586,
592 (1963).

30. 63 F.2d 206 (6th Cir. 1933).
31. Id. at 208.
32. "The notification which saves the buyer's rights under this Article . . . opens the
way for normal settlement through negotiation." UNIFORM COMMERcIAL CODE §2-607,
Comment 4.
33. The most notable provisions of article 2 that encourage compromise are §2-508
(right to cure) and §2-609 (right to assurance on prospective failure of performance).
See also Warren's Kiddie Shoppe v. Casual Slacks, Inc., 120 Ga. App. 578, 582, 171 S.E.2d 643,
646 (1969).
34. See Phillips, supra note 5, at 468-69.
35. Texas Motorcoaches, Inc. v. A.F.C. Motors Co., 154 F.2d 91 (3d Cir. 1946); L. A.
Green Seed Co. v. Williams, 246 Ark. 463, 438 S.W.2d 717 (1969). Settlement agreements
are highly favored in the law and will be upheld whenever possible because they are a
means of amicably resolving doubts and uncertainties and preventing law suits. D. H.
Overmeyer Co. v. Loflin, 440 F.2d 1213, 1215 (5th Cir. 1971).

36. See note 33 supra.
37. 6 A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS §1292 (1962).
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such settlements more easily voidable and would increase the sanction for
the fraud. 38
Probably the most prevalent rationale for the notice requirement is that
it prevents the assertion of stale claims against the seller.39 The courts early
held that the main purpose of the notice requirement was to prevent the
buyer from asserting a claim as a "mere afterthought" in an action by the
seller for the purchase price of the goods. 40 In some situations, however, it is
impossible to ascertain within a short time after acceptance that a breach has
occurred.41 This problem is partially eliminated by the fact that the time for
reasonable notice does not begin to run until the buyer discovers or should
have discovered the breach.42 Although this is often a difficult factual determination, 43 it does serve as a judicial vehicle for avoiding injustice to a
buyer who has acted in good faith but has suffered an injury not readily
discoverable. 4
Recognizing the broad purpose that the notice requirement is intended
to accomplish, it seems logical that such a requirement should extend to all
breaches arising out of sales transactions. The language of the Code supports
this construction, but cases arising under the Sales Act and the UCC have,
at times, limited the scope of the notice provision. In some instances these
limitations have served to defeat the Code's purpose of protecting sellers,
resulting in much confusion as to when the Code provisions should control.
SCOPE OF THE NoTICE REQUIREMENT

The language of both the Sales Act and the Code seem to indicate broad
applicability. Any limitations placed on the ambit of application have come

38. See Phillips, supra note 5, at 469. One such sanction might require the fraudulent
party to pay court costs, since no litigation would have been necessary had a reasonable
settlement been reached.
39. For a detailed discussion of the purpose of the notice requirement under the
Uniform Sales Act, see Wildman Mfg. Co. v. Cavenport Hosiery Mills, 147 Tenn. 551, 249
S.W. 984 (1923), where the court stated: "The purpose of this section [§49], indeed, seems
apparent, viz. to prevent the buyer from interposing belated claims for damages (too often
a mere afterthought) as an offset to a suit begun by the seller for the purchase price."
Id. at 986.
40. See note 39 supra.

41. See, e.g., Whitfield v. Jessup, 31 Cal. 2d 826, 193 P.2d 1 (1948). The plaintiff sued
for breach of warranty in sale of raw cream from which the plaintiff allegedly contracted
undulant fever. The plaintiff purchased the raw cream during January and March 1944,
but did not discover the cause of her illness until June 1944 when she became delirious and
was taken to a hospital. She gave notice of the breach of warranty in November 1944, and
the court held this delay was not unreasonable as a matter of law.
42. Ice Bowl v. Spalding Sales Corp., 56 Cal. App. 2d 981, 133 P.2d 846 .(lst Dist. Ct.
1943).
43. See S. WLLISTON, supra note 14, §484.
44. See note 41 supra. See also UNIFoRM CommERcIAL CODE §2-607, Comment 4, which
states: "Mhe rule of requiring notification is designed to defeat commercial bad faith,
not to deprive a good faith consumer of his remedy."
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from court holdings, not from revisions of the statute itself.45 Although the
majority of cases arising under sections 49 and 2-603 (3) (a) dealt with breaches
of warranty, they also have been applied to breaches of other promises under
4
the sales contract.
A delay in delivery or performance is one breach that often occurs in sales
transactions. Although the seller is fully aware that his performance is late,
the buyer must still give reasonable notice of the breach. 47 Arguably, it is not
necessary to give notice of a breach to a seller who has full knowledge of
it prior to notice. 48 However, the courts have generally rejected this argument
and have followed the reasoning of Justice Learned Hand in American
49
Manufacturing Co. v. United States Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Corp.
50
where he stated:
The plaintiff replies that the buyer is not required to give notice of
what the seller already knows, but this confuses two quite different
things. The notice "of the breach" required is not of the facts, which
the seller presumably knows quite as well as, if not better than, the
buyer, but of buyer's claim that they constitute a breach. The purpose
of the notice is to advise the seller that he must meet a claim for damages, as to which, rightly or wrongly, the law requires that he shall
have early warning.
The purpose of the notice requirement in late delivery situations then is not
to inform the seller that the goods were delivered late, but rather to notify
him that this is a breach for which he is to be held liable.
The requirement of notice for late deliveries is consistent with the general
purpose of the notice requirement and places no greater burden on the
buyer than he would shoulder when suffering any other breach of a sales
contract. Courts continue to require notice of such non-warranty breaches
under the Code and have made it clear that the requirement will not be
dropped merely because the seller was aware of the facts giving rise to the
breach. 5 1 This application to non-warranty breaches further supports the

45. Section 49 of the Sales Act applied to "the breach of any promise or warranty" and
§2-607 (3) (a) of the UCO applies to "any breach" and "any remedy."
46. See, e.g., Klein v. American Luggage Works, Inc., 52 Del. 406, 158 A.2d 814

(1960).
47. Id. See also Warren's Kiddie Shoppe, Inc. v. Casual Slacks, Inc., 120 Ga. App. 578,
171 S.E.2d 643 (1969). Illustrations in RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS §412 (1932) give an
example of the type of promise §49 applied to as follows: A contracts to sell B a specific
automobile on June 1. A tenders it on June 15, and B accepts it without comment. On
July 15, B brings an action against A for injury caused by the fortnight's delay. B cannot
recover. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACrs §412 (Illustrations 1932).
48. See, e.g., American Mfg. Co. v. United States Shipping Bd. Emergency Fleet Corp.
7 F.2d 565 (2d Cir. 1925).
49. Id.
50. Id. at 566.
51. See, e.g., Beacon & Plastic & Metal Prods., Inc. v. Corn Prods. Co., 57 Misc. 2d
634, 293 N.Y.S.2d 429 (1968); Warren's Kiddie Shoppe, Inc. v. Casual Slacks, Inc., 120 Ga.
App. 578, 171 S.E.2d 643 (1969).
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apparently broad reach of the notice provision. However, the notice provision
has not been given such broad application for breaches of warranty.
Notice of Breach of Warranty
The broadest area of cases where notice is required under the Code are
those involving a breach of warranty. During the 1960's, when the states
began widely accepting the Uniform Commercial Code52 the doctrine of
strict tort liability was also gaining acceptance.53 Although the Code applies
to warranties arising out of contract," and strict tort liability applies to
breaches of warranty arising in tort 55 the two theories sometimes overlap,
resulting in parallel but different rules governing the same problem., Since
notice is not required under strict tort liability, it is confusing to determine
when the buyer must give notice of breaches which seem to fit within both
57

theories.

Since most of the cases developing the strict tort doctrine were decided
prior to the adoption of the Uniform Commercial Code, much of the criticism
leveled at the Sales Act cannot be extended to the Code. 58 There is some
question as to whether the warranty scheme of the Code might as effectively
protect the consumer against defective products as does the strict tort doctrine
and yet extend some protection to the manufacturer and retailer by requiring seasonable notice of such breaches. Those cases eliminating the notice

52. Forty-six of the 51 jurisdictions adopting the UCC did so between 1960 and 1968.
53. The strict tort liability doctrine was first espoused in 1960 in Prosser, The Assault
upon the Citidel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 69 YALE L.J. 1099 (1960) [hereinafter cited as Prosser, Strict Liability].
54. UCC §2-102 provides that article 2 applies to all "transactions in goods."
55. Prosser states that strict tort liability "does not arise out of or depend upon any
contract, but is imposed by the law, in tort, as a matter of policy." Prosser, Strict Liability,

supra note 53, at 1134.
56. At first there were clear theoretical differences between sales law and strict tort
liability with regard to the doctrines of privity, disclaimer, limitation of remedies, and
notice of breach. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §402A (1965). However, the comments
to §402A recognize the theoretical similarities that negligence is not required under either
theory and contributory negligence will not be a bar to recovery. Recent decisions have
also eliminated differences in the privity area. See, e.g., Kassab v. Central Soya, 432 Pa. 217,
246 A.2d 848 (1968).
57. An example of a situation where both theories might apply is where an electrical
distributor expressly warrants to a purchaser buying 500 light bulbs that each would bum
with a red glow for a period of 2,500 hours. The liabilities arising from a breach of that
express warranty would be controlled by the UCC. But if one of the bulbs shattered and
injured the buyer, then the liabilities resulting from the injury would be governed by
strict tort. See Shanker, Strict Tort Theory of Products Liability and the Uniform Commercial Code: A Commentary on Jurisprudential Eclipses, Pigeonholes and Communication
Barriers, 17 W. Rxs. L. Riv. 5, 15 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Shanker].
58. One example is the election of remedies requirement under §69 of the Sales Act,
which in effect provided that when the buyer has rescinded the sale to him he cannot
thereafter maintain an action for breach of warranty. See IA UNIFORM LAws ANN. §69(1)
(d) (2) (1950). This election of remedies has been eliminated under the Code.
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provision in what are otherwise sales relationships have done so either on the
60
basis of the absence of privity"9 or the nature of the resulting injury.
Absence of Privity
Because warranties have traditionally been treated as contractual obligations, persons not in privity with the seller have been denied recovery for
6
injuries resulting from a breach of the seller's express or implied warranty.
Under the Sales Act the rigid application of privity oftentimes leads to preposterous results.62 However, under the doctrine of strict tort liability, first
espoused by Dean Prosser in 1960, privity need not be shown by a remote
consumer to recover for breach of implied warranty arising in tort and not
in contract. 63 Since these warranties arise in tort, and thus are not controlled
by the Sales Act or the Uniform Commercial Code, notice of breach is not
required.
Code section 2-60764 and the provisions dealing with warranty both speak
6
in terms of "buyer" and "seller." 5 Although Dean Prosser recognizes the
notice requirement as a "sound commercial rule" when applied to the immediate parties to the sale, he would limit the Code's warranty scheme with its
attendant notice requirement to the immediate buyer and seller only.6r

59. Although La Hue v. Coca Cola Bottling, Inc., 50 Wash. 2d 645, 314 P.2d 421 (1957),
was the first such holding, the absence of privity doctrine was pioneered by the California
supreme court in Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal.
Rptr. 697 (1962).
60. See Kennedy v. F. W. Woolworth Co., 205 App. Div. 648, 200 N.Y.S. 121 (Ist
Dep't 1923), where the court held that the Uniform Sales Act does not apply to food
for immediate consumption. Since this type of product will always involve personal injury,
the court was really setting the stage for the personal injury exception to the notice requirement. Cf. Whitfield v. Jessup, 31 Cal. 2d 826, 193 P.2d 1 (1948).
61. Prosser, Strict Liability, supra note 53, at 1130.
62. See, e.g., Hazelton v. First Nat'l Stores, Inc., 88 N. H. 409, 190 A. 280 (1937), where
the wife and children were not entitled to sue under implied warranty for damages caused
by meat infected with trichinae. Although the wife purchased and prepared the meat the
court held she was acting as agent for her husband who paid the grocer and therefore she
was not in privity with the seller as required by the Sales Act for recovery in warranty.
63. See note 53 supra.
64. See text accompanying note 9 supra. UNIFORM CONMMERCIAL CODE §2-103 provides:
"(1) In this article unless the context otherwise requires (a) 'Buyer' means a person who
buys or contracts to buy goods. (b) 'Seller' means a person who sells or contracts to sell
goods."
65. See UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §2-312 (Warranty of Title and Against Infringement: Buyer's Obligation Against Infringement); §2-313 (Express Wrarranty by Affirmation,
Promise, Description Sample); §2-314 (Implied Warranty: Merchantability, Usage of Trade);
§2-315 (Implied Warranty: Fitness for Particular Purpose); §2-316 (Exclusion or Modification
of Warranties); §2-317 (Cumulation and Conflict of Warranties Express or Implied); §2-318
(Third Party Beneficiaries of Warranties Express or Implied).
66. Dean Prosser appears to limit his dislike to situations where there has been a
personal injury and notice must be given to a remote seller. Prosser, Strict Liability, supra
note 53, at 1130.
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Such a limitation appears inconsistent with section 1-102, which provides that
the Code "shall be liberally construed and applied to promote its underlying
purposes and policies."6 7 Notwithstanding this language, numerous courts, by
applying the strict tort theory, have accepted Prosser's construction. 68 The
cases accepting such a view involve one of two situations: (1) where an
immediate buyer seeks damages from a manufacturer with whom he is not
in privity and (2) where redress is sought for injuries sustained by someone
other than the immediate buyer or consumer.
Actions Against the Manufacturer
The first category of cases eliminating the notice provision because privity
did not exist were those involving vertical privity or an action against the
manufacturer. 69 The forerunner in this area, La Hue v. Coca-Cola Bottling,
Inc.7 0o held a manufacturer liable to a remote consumer under a common law
warranty of wholesomeness "arising upon principles of tort."71 Since the case
did not involve an immediate buyer and seller, the notice provision was
deemed inapplicable.72 Although relying upon the lack of privity as a justification for removing the case from sales law, the court indicated that the consumer could have also recovered against his immediate vendor under common
law warranty without complying with the provisions of the Sales Act. 78
Clearly as between the purchaser and vendor there would have been the
requisite privity needed to place the case within sales law and its notice
74
requirement.
In contrast to La Hue the Supreme Court of Rhode Island held in San
Antonio v. Warwick Club Ginger Ale Co.7 5 that a consumer injured while
opening a bottle of soda was required to give notice to the bottler to recover
77
damages resulting from the injury.76 In Young v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co.,

67. UNIFORM CO MEMCIAL CODE §1-102, Official Text.
68. See, e.g., Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27
Cal. Rptr. 697 (1962).
69. The privity between those persons in the distributive chain, including the manufacturer, distributor, retailer, and purchaser is referred to as "vertical privity." The privity

between third parties and the purchaser or retailer is referred to as "horizontal privity."
See R. NoRDsRoM, HANDBOOK Or THE LAW OF SAL.Es §91 (1970).
70. 50 Wash. 2d 645, 314 P.2d 421 (1957).
71. Id. at 647, 314 P.2d at 422.
72. La Hue involved a consumer who became ill after consuming a portion of a soft
drink in which foreign matter was found. The consumer's action was against the bottler
for breach of implied warranty.
73. La Hue v. Coca Cola Bottling, Inc., 50 Wash. 2d 645, 314 P.2d 421 (1957).
74. The court then appears to be relying primarily on the nature of the warranty
rather than on the lack of privity in its holding.
75. 104 R.I. 700, 248 A.2d 778 (1968).
76. Id. at 708, 248 A.2d at 782 (1968). The question of whether the bottler had been
given reasonable notice was submitted to the jury. Thus, impliedly notice was required.

77. 287 A.2d 345 (RI. 1972).
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a consumer of an adulterated bottled beverage was allowed to recover through
the implied warranty of fitness for human consumption under the Uniform
9
Commercial Code. 78 In so holding the court noted:7
It serves no practical purpose to attempt to fit warranty liability into
the classification of negligence liability or absolute liability nor to
attempt to discern whether warranty liability is now tortious or contractual.
Although not addressing the question of notice, the Young court, utilizing
the statutory warranty scheme provided by the Uniform Commercial Code,
reached the same result as the La Hue court under strict tort doctrine. The
San Antonio and Young cases appear more consistent with the intent of the
drafters of the Code, since the policy of preventing belated claims and commercial bad faith applies equally with or without privity.
The courts not requiring notice to the manufacturer reason that such a
mandate would result in injustice to the consumer, since he would be unaware
of the requirement until he retained an attorney.,' Because a consumer will
normally contact an attorney upon discovery of the injury, it would seem
more consistent with the terms of the Code to extend the reasonable time for
giving notice rather than to eliminate the requirement completely.8s The
reasonable time period begins to run when the breach is discovered or
should have been discovered.8 2 Since most consumers would retain legal
counsel within a reasonable time after discovering the breach, they would
not be prejudiced by their lack of knowledge regarding the notice requirement because any notice given by the attorney would meet the requirements
of section 2-607.
Further justification for not requiring notice to the manufacturer is the
fact that a consumer who has not dealt with the manufacturer will encounter
difficulty in contacting such a remote party within a reasonable time after
his injury83 However, in light of today's constant exposure of the consumer
to national advertising campaigns by manufacturers, this argument loses much
of its force. Indeed, some courts have used this advertising as a basis for
liability of the manufacturer for breach of warranties under the Code.Difficulty in locating the manufacturer should be a consideration in determin-

78. Id. at 347. The facts in Young are almost identical to those in La Hue.
79. Id. at 349. The court termed "warranty" as "for all practical purposes a type of
liability distinct unto itself."
80. See, e.g., Greenman v. Yuba Powers Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal.
Rptr. 697 (1962).
81. In Whitfield v. Jessup, notice was given by an attorney retained by the consumer
who had been ill for several months as a result of using contaminated cream. See note 41
supra.

82.
83.
27 Cal.
84.

Ice Bowl v. Spalding Sales Corp., 56 Cal. App. 2d 918, 133 P.2d 846 (1st Dist. 1943).
See Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 63, 377 P.2d 897, 900,
Rptr. 697, 700 (1962). See also Prosser, Strict Liability supra note 53.
See, e.g., Kassab v. Central Soya, 432 Pa. 217, 226, 246 A.2d 848, 853 (1968).
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ing whether a reasonable time has elapsed rather than a justification for eliminating a good faith notice requirement. 85
One court has indicated that notice to the immediate seller is sufficient
to also maintain an action against the manufacturer. 6 However, in San
Antonio the court, after dismissing the claim against the immediate seller
for lack of notice, did not consider the question of whether notice to the
manufacturer would suffice to allow such an action.8s The former would seem
the most reasonable approach, since the consumer is most likely to contact
the immediate seller who in turn is likely to notify the manufacturer. There
is no indication in the Code, however, that notice to the manufacturer is to
be dispensed with altogether.
Actions by Injured Third Parties
The second category of cases eliminating the notice requirement involve
injuries to parties who are not purchasers and thus the problem of horizontal
privity.8 8 Again the courts applying strict tort liability appear to be giving
the words "buyer" and "seller" a very strict construction. The case of
Tomczuk v. Town of Cheshires" is illustrative. There, a young girl who was
a guest in the home of the purchaser of a defective bicycle was not required
to give the manufacturer notice of breach of warranty as a condition precedent to bringing an action for injuries sustained while riding the bicycle. °
The court noted that, since the girl was not a "buyer" as defined under the
Connecticut Uniform Commercial Code, she was not required to give notice
to the manufacturer: 91
Such a [third partyj beneficiary does not fall within the reason of...
[section 42a-2-607 (3)] in regard to discovery of defects and the giving
of notice within a reasonable time after acceptance, since he has
nothing to do with acceptance.
The court held that the legislature did not require notice by third party
beneficiaries to whom 2-318 extends.92 However, the comments to sections
2-318 and 2-607 indicate the contrary. 93 Section 2-318 includes the type of

85. See text accompanying note 144 infra.
86. Santor v. A. & M. Karagheusian, Inc., 44 NJ. 52, 207 A.2d 305 (1965).
87. See note 75 supra.
88. See note 69 supra.
89. 26 Conn. Supp. 219, 217 A.2d 71 (Super. Ct. 1965).
90. Id. at 222-23, 217 A.2d at 73.
91. Id. at 223, 217 A.2d at 74.
92. Id. at 222-23, 217 A.2d at 73-74.
93. UNIFoR Com mcmt. CODE §2-318, Comment 2, states that the purpose of §2-318
"is to give certain beneficiaries the benefit of the same warranty which the buyer received
in the contract of sale, thereby freeing any such beneficiaries from any technical
rules as to 'privity."' UNiFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §2-607, Comment 5, states "the reason of
this section does extend to requiring the beneficiary to notify the seller that an injury has
occurred."
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guest involved in Tomczuk; the comments to Section 2-607 (3) (a) state that
such a third party is required to at least give notice of the injury. 91
The comments to the Code also state that a beneficiary of the seller's
warranty can be properly held to the use of good faith in notifying, once
he has had time to become aware of the legal situation. 95 This language has
been interpreted to mean that the lay consumer need notify only when he
becomes legally aware that the notification is required. 96 If this interpretation
is correct, then Dean Prosser's criticism of the Sales Act that lay consumers
will not know to give notice until they become legally involved, is no longer
valid with regard to 2-607. 9 7 Lack of knowledge on the part of the lay consumer, however, is probably the major factor taken into consideration by the
drafters in providing a different standard for merchants than for consumers
in measuring the seasonableness of the notice. Lack of knowledge should not
serve as a basis for completely eliminating notice for injured third party
beneficiaries, but should be considered in determining if the consumer has
acted in good faith as required by the Code. 99
One of the primary purposes of the strict tort doctrine was to extend
implied warranties to consumers who would not otherwise be covered due
to an absence of privity. 99 Most cases espousing this doctrine arose prior to
the enactment of the UCC. 100 Since the Code now allows for extension of
2-318 warranties to classes of persons as broad as those protected under strict
tort liability, this purpose would be met. 101 The drafters of the Code have
attempted to eliminate the confusing dichotomy caused by two different
bodies of law applying to the same liability problem by bringing those classes
of persons protected by strict tort liability theory within the warranty provisions of the Code.
Since the Code now extends sales warranties to persons other than immediate purchasers and also provides for more relaxed standards for reasonable
time where consumers are involved, the inconvenience and possible injustice
to the consumer appears to be the only justification for continuing the application of strict tort theory to sales cases. The possible injustice to the consumer is partially eliminated by the relaxed reasonable time standard and the
inconvenience is greatly outweighed by the policy of affording sellers some
protection and the confusion that results from having two bodies of law
applicable to the same transaction with possibly different results. Therefore,
under the Code, absence of privity should no longer be a valid basis for
dispensing with the notice requirement.

See note 93 supra.
Id.
See Shanker, supra note 57, at 28.
Prosser, Strict Liability, supra note 53, at 1130.
See note 93 supra.
See Prosser, Strict Liability, supra note 53.
See Shanker, supra note 57, at 8.
101. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §2-318, Comment 3, states that Alternative C to this
section extends to that class of persons dealt with in modem cases.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
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Nature of Injury
Some courts have held the notice requirement inapplicable for certain
types of injury. 0 2 In Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc.1o3 the plaintiff

was injured while working with a power tool purchased by his wife. Justice
Traynor allowed recovery based on implied warranty without privity, although announcing that the obligation being thrust upon the defendant was
in fact a form of strict tort liability.14 Because the action sounded in tort
rather than in contract, the Uniform Sales Act and thus the notice requirement, were held inapplicable.1 5
Although Greenman appeared to turn upon privity, Seely v. White Motor
Co.., a subsequent decision by the same court, made it clear that the court
relied upon the presence of a personal, rather than economic injury, in
eliminating the requirement of notice. In Seely a truck purchased for heavyduty hauling bounced violently and after eleven months of unsuccessful
attempts to remedy this "galloping," the truck overturned as a result of brake
failure on a curve.0 7 The contention was made that the legislative scheme
of recovery under the Sales Act had been superseded by the doctrine of
strict tort liability in Greenman. The court rejected this argument, holding
the Sales law applicable to damages to the truck and the buyer's business.,,
The court noted that the doctrine of strict tort liability was designed "not
to undermine the warranty provisions of the sales act or of the Uniform
Commercial Code, but, rather to govern the distinct problem of physical
injuries." 10 9
Physical injury or harm apparently includes injury to property other than
to the product itself, as well as personal injury.""' The Restatement of Torts
102. Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr.
697 (1962); McCormak v. Hankscraft Co., 278 Minn. 436, 154 N.W.2d 488 (1967); Kennedy
v. F. W. Woolworth Co., 205 App. Div. 648, 200 N.Y.S. 121 (st Dep't 1923); Wights v. Staff
Jennings, Inc., 241 Ore. 301, 405 P.2d 625 (1965).
103. 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1962). For a detailed discussion of
Greenman see Note, Notice Requirement in Warranty Actions Involving Personal Injury,
CALi. L. REv. 586 (1963).

51

104. Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 63, 377 P.2d 897, 900, 27 Cal.
Rptr. 697, 700 (1962). California did not include §2-318 in its Uniform Commercial Code.
See CAL. Civ. CODE §819 (West 1963). However, one author suggests that the same result
could have been reached without strict tort liability under the UCC with §2-318 intact. See
Shanker, supra note 57.
105. Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 899, 27 Cal.
Rptr. 697 (1962).
106. 63 Cal. 2d 9, 403 P.2d 145, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17 (1965).
107. Id. at 12, 403 P.2d at 147, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 19.
108. Id. at 15, 403 P.2d 149, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 21.
109. Id. In a similar case, Santor v. A. & M. Karagheusian, Inc., 44 N.J. 42, 207 A.2d
305 (1965), the New Jersey supreme court applied strict tort liability to a claim for diminution in value of a defective carpet that had been purchased from the defendant. The Seely
court, however, stated it was improper to impose strict liability in such a case. Seely v.
White Motor Co., 63 Cal. 2d 9, 17, 403 P.2d 145, 151, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17, 23 (1965).
110. The California court in Seely v. White Motor Co., intimated that physical injury

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol25/iss3/4

14

Chavis: Notice
Breach and
Uniform Commercial
UNIVERSITY
OFof
FLORIDA
LAWthe
REVIEW
[Vol.Code
XXV
states that the rule of strict tort liability accepted by most courts extends
to physical harm caused to the "ultimate user or consumer, or to his property.",'" Thus, the doctrine of strict tort liability appears to limit the Code
1 12
to economic loss only.

This limitation on the Code was rejected by the Wisconsin supreme court,
which required notice of a personal injury arising out of a breach of warranty when the plaintiff's tire blew out.1

3

In reference to those "learned

authors" and courts not requiring notice where personal injury is involved,
11 4

the court stated:

It seems to us, however, that these authorities are expressing dissatisfaction with the statute, rather than a choice between reasonable
interpretations of its provisions.
The court recognized that the policies behind the notice requirement apply
as equally to personal injury claims as to claims for economic losses. 1 5
16
The Supreme Court of Alabama in Smith v. Pizitz of Bessemer, Inc.,1
also refused to recognize any distinction between physical and commercial
17
injuries, stating: 1
It may well be that the retail purchaser, the victim of personal injury,
is too unlearned in the ways of commerce to be held to the same
standards as the experienced merchant. If so, this consideration properly goes, in our opinion, to the question of what is a reasonable time
for notice to be given on the facts of the particular case.
More recent cases have likewise rejected the personal injury exception and
required notice pursuant to the Code. 8

to property would also be controlled by strict tort liability, 63 Cal. 2d 9, 18, 403 P.2d 145, 149,
45 Cal. Rptr 17, 21 (1965).

Ii.

RFSTATEMENT

(SECOND)

OF

TorTs §402A (1965) provides: "(1) One who sells any

product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer or to his
property is subject to liability for physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or
consumer, or to his property, if (a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a
product, and (b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial
change in the condition in which it is sold. (2) The rule stated in Subsection (1)applies
although (a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his
product, and (b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into
any contractual relation with the seller."
112. Economic loss includes such things as loss in value of the product itself and loss
of profits. See Price v. Gatlin, 241 Ore. 315, 405 P.2d 502 (1965).
113. Wojciuk v. United States Rubber Co., 19 Wis. 2d 224, 122 N.W.2d 737 (1963).
114. Id. at 235, 122 N.W.2d at 739.
115. The court emphasized the purpose of protecting the seller against personal injury
claims "generated by afterthoughts as to warranties made." Id. at 235, 122 N.W.2d at 740.
116. 271 Ala. 101, 122 So. 2d 591 (1960).
117. Id. at 104, 122 So. 2d at 593.
118. Nugent v. Popular Mkts., Inc., 353 Mass. 45, 228 N.E.2d 91 (1967); Manfredi v.
James C. Fettes, Inc., 352 Mass. 774, 226 N.E.2d 365 (1967).
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Support for the position that personal injuries are included in the warranty scheme of sales law can be found within the Code itself. Section
2-607 (3) (a) requires that the buyer give notice of "any breach" or be barred
from "any remedy."-1 9 One such remedy is consequential damages under section 2-715, which includes "injury to person or property proximately resulting
from any breach of warranty."' 4'l Section 2-719 provides that a "limitation
of consequential damages for injury to the person in the case of consumer
goods is prima fade unconscionable but limitation where the loss is commercial is not."1.2 ' The comments to section 2-607 also indicate that notice of
injury to the person must be given by the purchaser as well as by third party
beneficiaries protected under 2-318.122
If the courts continue to apply strict tort doctrine to what are otherwise
sales transactions, the requirement of notice and privity and the effectiveness
of disclaimers will all turn upon the "vagaries of pleading." By merely substituting the word "tort" for the word "contract" in a complaint based upon
implied warranty, the plaintiff will be allowed to circumvent a statutory
scheme that fifty-one jurisdictions have adopted into law. Such a result is
neither desirable nor acceptable where certainty in the law is lauded as an
important function by the courts.
SUFFICIENCY OF

NoncE

Whether proper notice has been given within a reasonable time is usually
a question of fact to be based upon all the surrounding circumstances1 23
Where only one reasonable inference is to be drawn from the facts,"24 however, it may become a question of law to be decided by the court.1 25 In either
case the burden of pleading and proving that proper notice was given within
a reasonable time rests upon the person relying upon the breach326 Where
sufficient notice is not plead and proved, no recovery will be allowed.1 2 The
notice must have been sufficient in form and content and must have been
28
given within a reasonable time.

119. UNIFORM CoMMERCIAL CODE §2-607(c) (a).
120. UNIFOmt COMMERCIL CODE §2-715.
121. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §2-719.
122. See note 93 supra.
123. Whitfield v. Jessup, 31 Cal. 2d 826, 193 P.2d 1 (1948).
124. This situation usually exists where the facts are not in dispute. However, where
facts are in dispute the length of time, form, and content may be a basis of deciding the
matter as a question of law. See notes 137, 144 infra.
125. See, e.g., Truslow & Fulle, Inc. v. Diamond Bottling Corp., 112 Conn. 181, 151 A.
492 (1930).
126. Vogel v. Thrifty Drug Co., 43 Cal. 2d 184, 272 P.2d 1 (1954).
127. Burkett v. Dental Perfection Co., 140 Cal. App. 2d 106, 294 P.2d 992 (2d Dist.
1956); Powers v. MacInnes, Inc., 343 Mass. 773, 178 N.E.2d 29 (1961).
128. UNIORMs ComsmLCAL CODE §2-607 (3) (a).
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Form and Content
Under both section 49 of the Uniform Sales Act and section 2-607 of the
Code, no particular form of notice is required. 1 2-9 Although notice may be
oral ' 3° or written, 31 it must be communicated to a responsible person. Notice to a mere employee of the person sought to be notified might not
meet the requirements of section 2-607 (3) (a).
Under the Sales Act a mere complaint of a breach or defect was not stifficient notice. 133 To meet the requirements, the notice must have apprised
the seller that he was to be held liable for damages,13 4 that the legal rights
of the purchaser have been violated, 35 or must have eliminated any refer36
ence that there was a waiver of remedies.1

The Official Code Comments to section 2-607 seem to indicate that the notice requirement under the Code should not be as rigorous as under the Sales
Act. 1 7 The language of comment 4 to section 2-607 has been accepted by
some courts as a clear indication that notice under the Code need not be a
claim for damages."3 However, most of these cases involve transactions between merchants and individual consumers,"3 9 and the courts have generally

129. See Anderson, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, Sales, art. 2, §2-607.
130. Whitfield v. Jessup, 31 Cal. 2d 826, 193 P.2d 1 (1948); Warren's Kiddie Shoppe, Inc.
v. Casual Slacks, Inc., 120 Ga. App. 578, 171 S.E.2d 643 (1969).
131. See, e.g., Johnson v. Comptoir Franco Belge D'Exportation Des Tubes D'Acier.
135 Cal. App. 2d 683, 288 P.2d 151 (2d Dist. 1955).
132. Ingle v. Marked Tree Equip. Co. 244 Ark. 1166, 428 S.W.2d 286 (1968); Silvera v.
Broadway Dep't Store, Inc., 35 F. Supp. 625 (S.D. Cal. 1940).
133. Arata v. Tonegato, 152 Cal. App. 2d 837, 314 P.2d 130 (Ist Dist. 1957); Trimount
Lumber Co. v. Murdough, 229 Mass. 254, 118 N.E. 280 (1918). An example of what the
courts considered to be a mere complaint is the letter in Trimount, which stated "that if
the 3 x 5 material needed for the first floor was not delivered promptly the defendant would
buy it in the Boston market." Id. at 256, 118 N.E. at 281.
134. See, e.g., Whitfield v. Jessup, 31 Cal. 2d 826, 193 P.2d 1 (1948); Dailey v. Holiday
Distrib. Corp., 260 Iowa 859, 151 N.W.2d 477 (1967).
135. Lieberman v. W. M. Gulliksen Mfg. Co., 332 Mass. 439, 442-43, 125 N.E.2d 396,
398 (1955).
136. Klein v. American Luggage Works, Inc., 52 Del. 406, 414, 158 A.2d 814, 819 (1960).
See also 46 AMt. JUR. Sales §257 (1943).
137. UNIFORM COXMERCIAL CODE §2-607, Comment 4, provides in part: "The content
of the notification need merely be sufficient to let the seller know that the transaction is
still troublesome and must be watched. There is no reason to require that the notification
which saves the buyer's rights under this section must include a clear statement of all the
objections that will be relied on by the buyer, as under the section covering statements of
defects upon rejection (Section 2-605). Nor is there reason for requiring the notification to
be a claim for damages or of any threatened litigation or other resort to a remedy. The
notification which saves the buyer's rights under this Article need only be such as informs
the seller that the transaction is claimed to involve a breach, and thus opens the way for
normal settlement through negotiation."
138. See Clarizo v. Spada Distrib. Co., 231 Ore. 516, 373 P.2d 689 (1962); Nugent v.
Popular Mkts., Inc., 353 Mass. 45, 228 N.E.2d 91 (1967).
139. See note 138 supra.
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held that the standard for notice required of individual consumers is not
the same as that applied to merchants.- The reason for the relaxed requirements for notice by individual consumers stems from the consumer's general
unfamiliarity with business usage and from the recognition that he is more
likely, because of ignorance, to delay assertion of an otherwise valid daim.' 41
This same reasoning will not usually be applicable to merchants and
businessmen. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts recognized this
1 4
fact in Nugent v. PopularMarkets, Inc.: 2
It is manifest from the comment to the Code that the notice of breach
required by § 2-607 was intended to be less rigorous than that required
by § 38 of the Sales Act, at least so far as applied to a household
purchaser rather than a "merchant buyer."
The fact that the "across the counter" purchaser had not given the specific
date of his purchase, did not render his notice of breach of warranty insuffi14 3
cient.
The court in Nugent also felt the purpose of the notice requirement was
to defeat commercial bad faith and not to deprive a good faith consumer of
his remedy.144 The court then indicated that the Code notice requirement
is to be less rigorous for "household purchasers" than "merchant buyers. ' 'A5
This reasoning may be based upon the fact that the good faith requirement
of the Code146 would place a greater burden upon the merchant than upon
the ignorant consumer. 47 A merchant buyer may be required to be more
specific with regard to particular sales, dates, or defects, especially where there
have been several transactions or deliveries between the buyer and seller. 148

140. See, e.g., Davison v. Wee, 93 Ariz. 191, 199, 379 P.2d 744, 749 (1963).
141. Wojciuk v. United States Rubber Co., 19 Wis. 2d 224, 235, 122 N.W.2d 737,
739 (1963).
142. 353 Mass. 45, 59, 228 N.E.2d 91, 94 (1967).
143. Id. at 49-50, 228 N.E.2d at 94.
144. Id. at 48-49, 228 N.E.2d at 94. See also UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §2-607, Comment 4, which states: "The time for notification is to be determined by applying commercial standards to a merchant buyer. 'A reasonable time' for notification from a retail consumer is to be judged by different standards so that in his case it will be extended, for the
rule of requiring notification is designed to defeat commercial bad faith, not to deprive
a good faith consumer of his remedy."

145. Nugent v. Popular Mkts., Inc., 353 Mass. 45, 49, 228 N.E.2d 91, 94 (1967).
146. UNIFORM Co m ctrAL CODE §1-203 provides: "Every contract or duty within this
Act imposes an obligation of good faith in its performance or enforcement."
147. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §1-201 (19) defines "good faith" as "honesty in fact in
the conduct or transaction concerned." UNIFORM CoMErtCAL CODE §2-103(1)(b) provides:
"In this article [Sales Article] unless the context otherwise requires, 'good faith' in the case
of a merchant means honesty in fact and the observance of reasonable commercial standards
of fair dealing in the trade." The language of these two sections appears to require that
individual consumers merely practice "honesty in fact" but will not be held to the observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing in the trade.
148. This requirement will not normally be burdensome to the merchant because he
must keep accurate business records.
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The Supreme Court of Iowa appeared to follow this reasoning in Daily v.
Holiday,14 9 continuing to hold that notice must be more than a mere complaint. The transaction involved a laundromat owner and a manufacturer
of washing machines. 150 The manufacturer had received a written complaint
stating that the machines were not working properly: "The last three weeks
our machines have developed a bad habit, and is using [sic] about fourteen
dollars worth of [electricity] a day."' 151 Although one of the manufacturer's
representatives had been called out to repair the machines, 152 the court held
that the letter and service calls were mere complaints and not sufficient notice.
They did not "directly or inferentially inform the [seller] that the buyer
' 53
or bailee claims breach of warranty and damages are demanded.'
Some state legislatures in enacting the Code have also suggested that the
notice be a claim for damages under the Code. The comments to the Minnesota Code, section 2-607, state:6 4
This subsection does not change the requirement that the notice must
be a claim for damages for breach and that a vague complaint about
quality is not sufficient.
Likewise, the Wisconsin Legislative Council Report, following section 2-607
of the Wisconsin Code,1 65 states that the "damages requirement appears to
be the same under the code."156 Other states have also provided that section
2-607 of the Code is in accord with the requirements of section 49 regarding
content of the notice.157
Thus, it appears that the Code requirements of form and content have
been relaxed for the individual consumer in most states. However, the merchant buyer will probably continue to be held to a stricter form and content
standard. The minimum notice required under the Code though need merely
be sufficient to let the seller know that the transaction is still troublesome and
must be watched. 58
Reasonable Time
A reasonable time under the Code has been judicially defined as "a time
which would be sufficient in the case of a man of ordinary intelligence and

149. 260 Iowa 859, 151 N.W.2d 477 (1967).
150. This is a classic example of the merchant-buyer situation.
151. Dailey v. Holiday Distrib. Co. 260 Iowa 859, 873, 151 N.W.2d 477, 487 (1967).
152. Some cases have held a seller attempting to remedy the defect waives his right to
notice. See, e.g., Boeing Airplane Co. v. O'Malley, 329 F.2d 585 (8th Cir. 1964).
153. See Dailey v. Holiday Distrib. Co., 260 Iowa 859, 875, 151 N.W.2d 477, 487 (1967).
154. MIcH. STAT. ANN. §36.2-607 (1966).
155. Wis. STAT. ANN. §402.607 (1964).

156. Id.
157. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. §109A-2-607 (1962); 5A DF.L. CODE §2-607 (1971) (Delaware Study Comment); ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 26, §2-607 (1967) (Illinois Code comments).
158. See text accompanying note 137 supra.
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prudence under the circumstances of the case."' 159 The reasonableness of the
delay in giving notice in each case may depend upon the nature of the defect
or breach, 160 the type of purchaser involved,' 61 and possible prejudice to the
16 2
seller.
The time for notification begins to run when the purchaser knew or
should have known of the breach. 63 Thus, where latent defects exist the time
does not begin to run until the latent defect is discovered or discoverable.164
For example, in Q. Vandenberg & Sons, N. V. v. Siter,'- a delay in giving
notice of defective flower bulbs was held justified because the defect was
latent and not discoverable until flowering time. 66 With regard to defects
not known at the time of delivery but discoverable by reasonable inspection,
it has been held that under the notice provision there is an implied duty
to inspect within a reasonable time.167 Thus, failure to inspect would not be
justification for delay in giving notice.
It is uniformly held that a reasonable time in which an individual consumer must give notice is different than that for a merchant buyer. 68 Since
a consumer is unfamiliar with commercial practices and therefore is less
likely to give immediate notice of an otherwise valid claim, the reasonable
time period for a consumer is longer than that allowed to a merchant. 6 9
Often the question of reasonable time has been decided solely on the basis
of whether the seller has been prejudiced by the delay.170 In Pritchard v.
Liggett & Meyers Tobacco Co.," a delay of ten and one-half months in giving
the manufacturer notice of a breach of warranty was held not unreasonable
because the manufacturer had not been prejudiced in any way by the delay 7 2
The Pritchard court, however, approached the question of prejudice by

159.
160.
161.

Myers v. Antone, 227 A.2d 56, 58 (D.C. App. 1967).
See, e.g., Steiner v. Jarrett, 130 Cal. App. 2d 869, 280 P.2d 235 (Sup. Ct. 1955).
See Nugent v. Popular Mkts., Inc., 353 Mass. 45, 228 N.E.2d 91 (1967). See also

Comment 4, supra notes 137, 144.
162. Pritchard v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 295 F.2d 292 (3d Cir. 1961; Naaf v.
Griflits, 201 Kan. 64, 439 P.2d 83 (1968).
163. Ice Bowl v. Spalding Sales Corp., 56 Cal. App. 2d 918, 133 P.2d 846 (Ist Dist. 1943).
Although the Code refers to notice after acceptance, two recent decisions involving breach
by delay in delivery have held that notice of breach may be given prior to acceptance. See
MacGregor v. McRek, Inc., 494 P.2d 1297 (Colo. 1971); Jay V. Zimmerman Co. v. General
Mills, Inc., 327 F. Supp. 1198 (E.D. Mo. 1971).
164. Steiner v. Jarrett, 130 Cal. App. 2d 869, 280 P.2d 235 (Sup. Ct. 1955); Q. Vandenburg & Sons, N. Y. v. Siter, 204 Pa. Super. 392, 204 A.2d 494 (1964).
165. 204 Pa. Super. 392, 204 A.2d 494 (1964).
166. 204 A.2d at 499.
167. Myers v. Antone, 227 A.2d 56, 58 (D.C. App. 1967).
168. See note 120 supra.
169. See note 120 supra; Wojduk v. United States Rubber Co., 19 Wis. 2d 224, 122
N.W.2d 737 (1963).
170. This is inconsistent with the majority view deeming proper notice a prerequisite to
bringing the action. Prejudice is usually an affirmative defense plead in conjunction with
laches or waiver. See Bengford v. Carlem Corp., 156 N.W.2d 855 (Iowa 1968).
171. 295 F.2d 292 (3d Cir. 1961).

172. Id. at 298-99.
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engrafting laches onto the notice requirement. 173 Laches arises when "a defendant's position or rights are so prejudiced by the length of time and
inexcusable delay, plus attendant facts and circumstances, that it would be
17 4
an injustice to permit presently the assertion of a claim against him."'
Since laches is usually an affirmative defense, this approach seems inconsistent
with the majority view that notice is a prerequisite to the plaintiff's action,
to be plead and proved by him. 7
Generally, when considering a specific time period, the courts will agree
that it cannot be held as a matter of law that one month is an unreasonable
length of time to wait before giving notice.-7 6 Moreover, where there has been
no prejudice to the seller, a delay of as much as sixty days has been held reasonable.' 7 7 However, where a buyer takes no steps to discover defects or to give
notice of a breach of warranty until two months after acceptance, the courts
have held the delay unreasonable as a matter of law. 1s Delays of six
months" 9 and nine months8 0 have also been held unreasonable as a matter
of law where the defects were easily discoverable at the time of acceptance.
Most of the cases litigated under the Sales Act and Code notice requirements
have hinged on the question of reasonable time.'8 In all cases the court
considered not only the specific time of delay but also the surrounding
circumstances. Thus, the courts balance the equities in determining what is a
reasonable time for the giving of notice, and this time may vary considerably
depending upon the facts and circumstances of the particular case.
CONCLUSION

In order to appreciate the full value of the notice requirement in commercial transactions, it must first be recognized that such a requirement is
not a strict rule of contract law but a statement of policy by the legislatures
of fifty-one jurisdictions.8 s2 As the comments of the drafters indicate, each
section of the Code must be read "in light of the purpose and policy of the
rule or principle in question.' 8 3 When the notice requirement was first
adopted under the Uniform Sales Act, the courts recognized that the purpose
was (1) to eliminate the harshness of the common law rule that acceptance
by the buyer served as a waiver of all defects in the goods accepted, and (2)

173.

Id. at 298.

174. Id. at 299.
175. Arata v. Tonegato, 152 Cal. App. 2d 837, 314 P.2d 130 (Ist Dist. 1957).
176. See, e.g., Burkett v. Westmoreland Supply Co., 41 Westmoreland L.J. 35 (C. P.
Westmoreland County, Pa. 1957).
177. Naaf v. Griffits, 201 Kan. 64, 439 P.2d 83 (1968).
178. Ingel v. Market Tree Equip. Co., 244 Ark. 1166, 428 S.W.2d 286 (1969).
179. Wilke Metal Prods., Inc. v. David Architectural Metals, Inc., 92 Ill. App. 2d 265,
236 N.E.2d 303 (1968).
180. Necho Coal Co. v. Denise Coal Co., 87 Pa. 567, 128 A.2d 771 (1957).
181.

See generally 1 L. FRUMER & M. FVIEDIAN, PRODUCTS LIABILrrY §19.05 (2) (1961).

182. See note 3 supra.
183.

See UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §1-102, Comment 1.
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at the same time to give the merchant some protection against stale claims."&4
This policy was continued under the Uniform Commercial Code. 8 5
The ad hoc development of strict tort liability has to a great extent
served to circumvent this policy of granting protection to merchants as well
as to consumers. Although the "intricacies of the law of sales"' 8 6 often resulted
in harsh results for the consumer under the Sales Act,l87 there is no reason to
believe that such will occur under the Uniform Commercial Code. Drastic
changes in the once rigid treatment of privity8 s and disclaimer, 8 9 coupled
with the relaxed standards for notice by consumers, 9 0 make it dear that the
drafters of the Code were sensitive to the problems of unwary consumers.
Those courts that have eliminated the notice requirement from sales
transactions by merely labeling the action as tortious have ignored the true
spirit of the Code. By making merchants insurers of their products regardless
of the consumer's failure to seasonably inform the seller or manufacturer of
the injury, these courts have destroyed a protective device that is necessary
for the furtherance of the over-all policy of good faith dealings under the
Code.
The comments make it dear that section 2-607 was designed "to defeat
commercial bad faith, not to deprive a good faith consumer of his remedy."' 191
With the flexibility allowed the courts under the Code, there is no reason
an injured consumer or purchaser cannot find more than adequate protection
under the warranty scheme of the Code. If, however, the consumer fails to
act in good faith and unduly prejudices the rights of the seller, the Code
makes it clear that he should be barred from "any remedy."' 92 The legislatures
of forty-nine states have expressed their approval of this policy. Consequently,
case law'that arose primarily before the enactment of the Code should not
serve to circumvent the entire warranty scheme of the Code. Furthermore,
the uniformity sought under the Code is destroyed by the differing case law
approaches to products liability. The simplicity and clarity of the uniform
statute is lost in the confusion of having two bodies of law govern the same
transaction. It is time for the courts to follow the reasoning of the Supreme
93
Court of Rhode Island and recognize:'

184. See Whitfield v. Jessup, 31 Cal. 2d 826, 193 P.2d 1 (1948)

(construing §49 of

the Uniform Sales Act).
185. See

UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE

§2-607 (3) (a).

18G. See Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 64, 377 P.2d 897, 901, 27
Cal. Rptr. 697, 701 (1962). "The remedies of injured consumers ought not to be made to

depend upon the intricacies of the law of sales." Id.
187. See note 62 supra.

188. See text accompanying note 84 supra.
189. See, e.g., UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §§2-316 (Exclusion or Modification of Warranties); 2-719 (Contractual Modification or Limitation of Remedy); 2-302 (Unconscionable

Contract or Clause).
190. See text accompanying notes 137-141, 168-173 supra.
191. See note 144 supra.

192. See text accompanying note 119 supra.
193. Young v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 287 A.2d 345, 349 (R. I. 1972).
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